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CUSTODY OF LEGITIMATE CHILDREN
According to the Civil Code of Louisiana the question of
custody of legitimate children during the existence of the parents' marriage and common life is a simple one: custody belongs
to the parents.' The question of custody after the dissolution of
the marriage or upon separation from bed and board presents no
difficulties when determined solely according to the articles of
the code. In such cases the minor is placed under tutorship 2 and
custody of the minor belongs to the tutor. 3 The only exception
to this rule is found in Article 253, which provides that the
mother who exercises her privilege of refusing the tutorship retains custody of her children. 4 Since the passage of the Women's.
Emancipation Act of 1921P it is probable that the mother can no
longer refuse the tutorship; therefore it is safe to say that the
law does not provide for custody apart from tutorship except in
the special instances hereinafter referred to.
Originally our jurisprudence followed the provisions of the
code awarding custody to the tutor or tutrix. It was said in Percy,
Tutor v. Provan, Executor, 6 an 1840 case, that "the duties, powers
and privileges of the tutor, under our laws, cannot be divided; he
is to have the care of the person of the minor, and it cannot be
taken from him."7 The code provides that the tutor can be deprived of custody only by removal from tutorship." The causes
for exclusion and removal are based entirely on business considerations 9 except in the case of "notoriously bad conduct."'10
Consequently, under the code, a tutor may retain custody when
the actual welfare of the child is endangered because none of
the enumerated causes for removal from the tutorship exist.
Our earlier jurisprudence not only adhered to the rule of Percy
v. Provan, but, at least in the case of natural tutors, construed
the causes for exclusion and removal with great strictness and
in the parent's favor.
In Ozanne v. Delile (1826)11 in answer to charges of "no1. Art. 216, La. Civil Code of 1870.
2. Art. 250, La. Civil Code of 1870.
3. Art. 337, La. Civil Code of 1870.
4. La. Civl Code of 1870.
5. La. Act 34 of 1921(E.S.), §§ 1, 2 [Dart's Stats. (1939)
6. 15 La. 69 (1840).
7. 15 La. 69, 74-75.
8. Art. 337, La. Civil Code of 1870.
9. Arts. 302, 303, 304, 305, 365, La. Civil Code of 1870.
10. Arts. 303(1), 305, La. Civil Code of 1870.
11. 5 Mart.(N.S.) 21 (La. 1826).
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toriously bad conduct"' 2 the supreme court made the oft-quoted
statement that "the law presumes much on the strength of natural affection; and knows that in general it cannot trust to any
surer pledge, than that which is furnished by parental attachment. The evidence therefore should be strong and conclusive
13
that would destroy that presumption.'
In Segura, Under-Tutor v. Prados, Tutor (1847) ,'14another
case in which it was sought to remove the father from the tutorship, we find an instance of the court's refusal to deny custody
to the natural tutor unless the case is, beyond any possibility of
doubt, covered by the codal articles on exclusion and removal
from the tutorship. Although the father was found "improvident,
careless in his pecuniary affairs, and perhaps wanting in habits
of industry,"1 5 he was allowed to retain the tutorship and consequently the custody of the child since it did not appear that
he was "addicted to any such vices or immoralities of conduct,
as should deprive a father of the care and protection of the persons and property of his children."' 16
Several legislative acts contain provisions contrary to the
principle that custody is inseparable from tutorship. The laws
concerning juvenile courts, such as Act 83 of 1921,17 have created
in the courts a quasi-criminal jurisdiction over children under
the age of seventeen designated as "delinquent" or "neglected."
This jurisdiction cannot be exercised in civil cases and therefore
does not directly affect the decisions in civil custody cases. But,
because the court is authorized in cases falling under the act to
remove children from the custody of their parents, tutors or other
persons, it is an indication of the latest legislative policy upon
the right of custody, and, as an expression of policy, might influence the course of the jurisprudence.
Act 45 of 190215 provides that a minor may have two tutors,
one an individual having custody and the other a bank having
only the management of the property of the minor. 19 The act is
of no importance in a discussion of the legislative and judicial
separation of custody from tutorship since it recognizes the right
of the individual tutor to custody. Although there is a division
12. Art. 305, La. Civil Code of 1870.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

Ozanne v. Delile, 5 Mart.(N.S.) 21, 32 (La. 1826).
2 La. Ann. 751 (1847).
2 La. Ann. 751, 752.
Ibid.
Dart's Stats. (1939) §§ 1679-1685.
Dart's Stats. (1939) §§ 582-591.
La. Act 45 of 1902, § 1 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 582).
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in the exercise of the tutorial functions, administration of property and care of the person, there is no complete separation of
tutorship and custody.
Act 79 of 189420 is of great importance in examining the trend
of the Louisiana jurisprudence on the question of custody. It expresses a radical departure from the concept that custody is a
function of the parental or tutorial power. This act gives to judges
of the district courts authority to remove a child from the custody
of its parents, tutors or other persons when the physical or moral
welfare of the child is "seriously endangered by the neglect, or
abuse, or the vicious, or immoral habits, or associations ' 21 of the
' 22
persons having custody or by their "inability, refusal or neglect
properly to care for the child. The Louisiana Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children is authorized to bring suit. 23 The
district judges are authorized to restore custody on a proper
24
showing.
The courts have not only used Act 79 of 1894 in the case of
really serious threats to the welfare of children, but have also
applied it broadly as the law in custody disputes involving no
great danger to the child's welfare. Thus in State ex rel. Taylor
v. Jones (1904)25 the father was denied custody of his two and
a half year old child because the child was extremely delicate
and the maternal grandmother was better able to care for it. It
was admitted that under a strict interpretation of the law perhaps the father should have custody, but under the spirit of the
law and in view of Act 79 of 1894, which was regarded as controlling, the grandmother should keep the child for the length of
time necessary to assure its continued good health. The court
held that the child's "physical welfare" was endangered by the
father's "inability" to care for it.
Not only has the court applied Act 79 broadly, but in some
cases it has decided the question of custody without reference or
regard to the principles of tutorship and without specific reference
to Act 79.
In 1901, in State ex rel. Lasserre v. Michel,26' a father brought
a habeas corpus suit against his wife, from whom he was not
judicially separated, to compel her to restore custody of their
20. Dart's Stats. (1939) §§ 4887-4890.
21. La. Act 79 of 1894, § 1 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 4887].
22. Ibid.

23. Id. at § 4 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 4890].
24. Id. at § 3 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 4889].
25. 113 La. 298, 36 So. 973 (1904).
26. 105 La. 741, 30 So. 122, 34 L.R.A. 927 (1901).
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child. The sole question in the case was the right of the husband
to sue his wife on a cause of action not within one of the exceptions of Article 10527 of the Code of Practice. The district court
dismissed the suit on an exception of no cause of action. The
supreme court reversed the decision and allowed the father's
suit, saying "the courts in the United States while adopting the
legal principle that the father is usually entitled to the custody
of his children, have been inclined to modify it by adopting the
equitable principle that this rikht must yield in some instances
to considerations affecting the welfare of the children ... .
Since the merits of the case were not at issue, this language must
be regarded as dictum. However, the dictum became the rule in
later cases.
In a 1908 decision, State ex rel. Kearney v. Steel, 201 the judgment of the district court refusing to remove a child from the
custody of the paternal grandmother was reversed and custody
was restored to the mother. There was no allegation that the
mother was not a suitable person or could not care for the child.
The question was what weight should be given the child's preference in determining custody. In holding that the district court
should not have considered the child's preference, the court stated
"the judge has unquestionably some discretion in dealing with
the custody of children; but that discretion has to be based on
more solid and substantial grounds than those on which the
3 0°
district judge acted."
Considering the mildness of the language used in both the
Michel and Steel cases in delineating the limits of the trial judge's
discretion in custody cases it is startling to find in Ex parte Ryan
(1910)31 (a suit by the father to obtain custody from relatives of
the mother) a hearty endorsement of the Michel case. It is startling because in the Ryan case the supreme court went exhaustively into the question of the preference of the child. It said
"We are satisfied that out of the troubles and dissentions between
the parents the child has grown up to have no affection towards
her father; that she has reached an age when to be forced to live
with him and his family and to separate from those to whom
she has become attached would be productive 32of future unhappiness to her, resulting in anything but good."
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

La. Code of Practice of 1870.
105 La. 741, 746, 30 So. 122, 124 (1901).
121 La. 215, 46 So. 215 (1908).
121 La. 215, 219, 46 So. 215, 216.
126 La. 449, 52 So. 573 (1910).
Ibid.
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Because of the subsequent confusion of the Michel dictum
with the broad language in the decision of the Ryan case, the
Michel case was later regarded as expressing the view that the
courts have extremely broad discretion in dealing with problems
of custody and that the preference of the child is an important
element in custody determination. However, the Ryan case is the
true origin of what may be termed the "broad discretion" rule in
custody disputes. Thus a new line of jurisprudence was created
opposed to the "narrow discretion" rule of the Steel case. Subsequent decisions have followed first one then the other of these
lines.
In Ex parte Lincoln (1911) 33 a father, despite evidence that
he had been living in concubinage during his marriage and afterward, gained custody of his two children from the father and
sister of the mother. The supreme court expressed the view that
a father is entitled to possession of his children unless the court
is satisfied that he will neglect or expose them to improper influences. The Delile and Prados cases were cited in support of the
decision, indicating that the concept of the inseparability of tutorship and custody had not yet been completely discarded. But
after deciding the case on the basis of the "narrow discretion"
rule with reference to principles of tutorship, the court proceeded
to distinguish the Ryan case on the grounds that there the "welfare and happiness" of the child would have been endangered
by giving the father custody. This indicates that the court had
not lost sight of the "broad discretion" rule but only considered
its application unnecessary.
The principle of the Ryan case was denied, however, in State
ex rel. Sevier v. Sevier (1917).34 The mother was restored to the
custody lost while she was in a Georgia insane asylum. The court
said, "the question is not whether they will be as happy or as
well provided for with their mother as they are now with their
foster parents."3 5 "The tutorship and authority over minor children whose father is dead belongs of right to the surviving moth36
er . ,
In the same year, the court held in Heitkamp v. Ragan3 7
that the allegations of the father's unworthiness were insufficient
to deprive him of custody in the light of the rule laid down in
Kearney v. Steel.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

128 La.
141 La.
141 La.
Ibid.
142 La.

278, 54 So. 818 (1911).
60, 74 So. 630 (1917).
60, 67, 74 So. 630, 632.
81, 76 So. 247 (1917).
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Until 1922, the Michel dictum and the rule of the Ryan case,
although recognized by the courts, were not used as the basis for
decision. But in that year, in State ex rel. Harnerv. Karpe38 the
court cited the Michel and Ryan cases as justification for the
proposition that the welfare of the child is the predominant consideration in determining custody.
The Karpe case cannot be said to reaffirm the proposition in
the Ryan case that the court must give weight to the preference
of the child but is more in line with the Michel dictum concerning the child's welfare aside from mere preference. There was a
greater showing here on the part of respondents of their ability
to care properly for the child than that made by petitioners and
there was no problem of interference with the rights of a parent.
Although the Ryan case was not specifically mentioned, its
principle was refuted in State ex rel. Martin v. Talbot in 1926. 39
The court refused to interfere with the authority of a natural
tutrix (a mother suing for the return of her child whom she had
left with her sister because of her inability to support it) since
it was not a case for the application of Act 79 of 1894. There was
no allegation that the mother was unworthy, but only a showing
that the child preferred to remain with the sister. The court said,
"the child's preference to live with someone else cannot prevail
over the parent's authority to compel the child to live with him
or her. ' 40 Sevier v. Sevier was cited as one of the authorities for
this proposition.
In the Talbot case, the supreme court, for the first time, gave
voice to the fact that the decision in Lasserre v. Michel was not
authority for any proposition concerning the equities of custody
disputes. "In State ex rel. Lasserre v. Michel the ruling was merely that the marital relation did not prevent the husband's suing
his wife for possession of their4 1 child, on allegations of unworthiness on the defendant's part."
In view of the recognition in Martin v. Talbot of the limitation of the Michel case, coupled with the court's criticism of the
Ryan rule, it is surprising to find another 1926 decision in which
the "broad discretion" rule of those cases was given a liberal
application-State ex rel. Peter v. Stanga.42 The father sought to
regain custody from the maternal grandmother. There was
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

151 La. 585, 92 So. 124 (1922).
161 La. 192, 108 So. 411 (1926).
161 La. 192, 196, 108 So. 411, 413.
State ex rel. Martin v. Talbot, 161 La. 192, 197, 108 So. 411, 413 (1926).
161 La. 978, 109 So. 783 (1921).
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nothing really to be said against the father except that he was
re-married and had another small child who, the court decided,
prevented his wife from being "in position to properly look after
her step-daughter. ' 43 Nowhere is the judicial severance of tutorship and custody more strikingly evidenced than in the court's
statement that, "the fact that the relator has been confirmed as
natural tutor of his daughter has not added any strength to his
case. No property rights are involved, and, so far as the control
of the person of the child is concerned, relator's right as natural
tutor is no greater than his parental right. ' 44 Apparently, the
parental right was found to be remarkably slight since the court
called it a "cold, technical right" and allowed respondent to retain
the child.
In State ex rel. Stockstill v. Spiers (1930) 4 5 the court cited
the Michel and Ryan cases as justification for refusing the father
custody against the maternal grandmother. They enthusiastically
repeated the language of the Stanga case concerning the "cold,
technical right" of the father. The facts of this case, however,
keep it from being quite as liberal an application of the Ryan
rule as was found in the Stanga case. The father had no property,
no money and no job and was "a very young man with an unsettled nature, and with no experience with caring for and raising children. ' 4 6 Furthermore, there was evidence that he had not
wanted the child and had tried to induce his wife to submit to
an abortion. Therefore, considering that the absolute welfare of
the child was in question, the court's language is broader than
the facts necessitate when they discuss "the interest and happiness of the child which alone is to be consdered."4' 7
As if exhausted by so much liberality, the court in State ex
rel. Bethany v. Corley48 (a case in which only the child's preference was in contest) ignored the Stanga case and affirmed the
expression in the Talbot case that the parent's authority should
not be interfered with except under conditions presenting a real
danger to the physical or moral welfare of the child. The "cold,
technical right" of the father was allowed to triumph and custody was taken from the maternal aunt and uncle.
In a 1932 decision, State ex rel. Burleigh v: Savoie,49 a father
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

161 La. 978, 980, 109 So. 783, 784.
Ibid.
170 La. 454, 128 So. 275 (1930).
170 La. 454, 457, 128 So. 275.
170 La. 454, 456, 128 So. 275.
172 La. 266, 134 So. 87 (1931).
176 La. 115, 145 So. 285 (1932).
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was allowed to recover his child from the maternal grandparents
despite their charges of negligent and immoral conduct, such
conduct consisting chiefly of bootlegging. Although the court
talked grandly of the rights of the father, it distinguished the
Stanga case on the grounds that there the child had lived with his
grandparents all his life and become attached to them while
here the child's attachment was to his father with whom he had
lived. Three justices dissented, Justice Odom insisting that the
child's welfare was endangered by the "immoral habits" of the
father and that Act 79 of 1894 would justify denying him custody
since "the welfare of a child is paramount to the parent's natural
and legal right of custody."50
The majority as well as the dissent showed influences of the
"broad discretion" jurisprudence. It was indicated that had they
thought the situation demanded it, custody would have been
granted the grandmother. However, on rehearing the former decision was reinstated with Justices Land, Rogers and Odom again
dissenting.
The two lines of cases continue, but more and more it becomes evident that, although there is no requirement that the
parent be financially better able to care for the child than the
other party seeking custody, there is a requirement imposed by
the courts that the parents be able to provide the child with a
certain minimum standard of living, and that there be no special
conditions (such as the extreme youth of the child or a lack of
time to devote to the child's care) which would be detrimental
to the best interests of the child.
In cases like State ex rel. Pitre v. Lefort (1934),51 when on a
showing that relator had seduced the child's mother and married
her only upon the institution of criminal proceedings, custody
was left with the maternal grandparents, the Michel, Ryan,
Stanga and Spiers cases ("broad discretion" cases) being cited.
On the other hand, in cases such as State ex rel. Perdue v. Carkuff, 52 involving only the child's preference, the Lincoln, Talbot
and Ragan cases ("narrow discretion" cases) were cited.
The most recent trend seems to be toward an extremely
liberal use of discretion in custody cases and the use of the
language of the Michel and following cases to justify depriving
the parent of custody even when there is no real question of en50. 176 La. 115, 135, 145 So. 285, 291.
51. 179 La. 919, 155 So. 435 (1934).
52. 182 La. 920, 162 So. 629 (1935).
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dangering the child, but merely a question of who can give the
best care.
In 1939, in State ex rel. Landry v. Robin13 the maternal
grandmother was allowed to retain custody of a six-months old
child solely on the ground of the child's tender age with no averment of positive disqualification on the part of the father. Justices
Higgins and Fournet dissented. Justice Fournet declared the
necessity for having solid and substantial reasons for depriving
the father of custody and cited the Lincoln, Talbot, Ragan and
Carkuff cases.
In State ex rel. Conerly v. Sonier54 allegations of the father's
cruelty to the mother and his non-support of both mother and
child were sufficient basis for the court's decision in which custody was granted the maternal grandparents. The Michel, Ryan,
Lefort and Robin cases were cited. There was no dissent because
the facts of the case were such that, under the modern liberal
tendency, there could be no argument against the court's exercising discretion.
So it seems settled to date in view of the Sonier case that the
court will continue to use its discretion when the parent is really
unfit. Despite the dissent in Landry v. Robin it is probable that
the court will also continue to exercise discretion in cases not
involving the fitness of the parent to have custody but solely the
question of who is best able to care for the child.
It also seems that the child's preference will be considered,
among other factors, but will be of persuasive value only in making a determination and that if, as in Perdue v. Carkuff, a parent
is of impeccable character and is able to care for the child, the
fact that the child does not wish to live with the parent will not
be considered.
The prevailing tendency toward liberality in custody cases
and the long line of jurisprudence justifying such liberality rather
obscures the fact that the supreme court, in refusing custody to
a tutor without first depriving him of tutorship or without applying Act 79 of 1894, is acting without legislative sanction. However, in view of the necessity for such action and the unfairness
in certain cases of following the strict codal principles of tutorship and custody, perhaps this action on the part of the court is
justified. Nonetheless, this judicial legislation creates a certain
amount of confusion and a codal revision that is consistent with
the judicial trend should be made.
MARY BIRD PERKINS
53. 193 La. 789, 192 So. 349 (1939).
54. 209 La. 138, 24 So.(2d) 290 (1945).

